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Abstract:  This article analyzes factors influencing the decisions of prospective lenders to extend 
credit to small and minority-owned businesses.  Using data from a government survey of small 
businesses, the analysis reveals that prospective lenders (primarily commercial banks) are four 
times more likely to deny credit to firms owned by African-Americans than to firms owned by 
Non-Hispanic whites, and are twice as likely to deny credit to firms owned by Asian-Americans 
than to firms owned by Non-Hispanic whites.  These differences in denial rates remain both 
statistically and economically significant, even after controlling for differences in the type and 
size of the prospective loan; in the age, experience, education, and creditworthiness of the firm’s 
primary owner; in the age, size, capital structure, profitability, organizational form, 
creditworthiness, and industry of the firm; and in the types and length of pre-existing 
relationships between the firm and its prospective lender.  Interestingly, these differences in 
denial rates are significant only when the prospective lender is a commercial bank.  
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Availability of Credit to Small and Minority-Owned Businesses:   
Evidence from the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finances 
 
 
Much has been written about the access of minorities to the market for home-mortgage 
credit (e.g., Munnell et al. 1996; Hunter and Walker 1996; Berkovec, Canner, Gabriel, and 
Hannan 1994; Yezer, Phillips, and Trost 1994;  Carr and Megbolugbe 1993; Duca and Rosenthal 
1993; Horne 1993; Canner and Smith 1992; Black, Schweitzer, and Mandell 1978), but minority 
access to the market for small-business credit has been largely neglected by academics.  There 
are two notable exceptions: Bates (1991), who examines , and Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo 
(1998), who examine data from the Federal Reserve Board’s 1987 National Survey of Small 
Business Finances.  In large measure, this relative silence has been attributable to the paucity of 
data on the availability of small-business credit.  In 1993, however, the Federal Reserve Board 
authorized its staff to conduct a nationally representative survey of small and minority-owned 
businesses that would collect information about the availability of credit to such businesses.  The 
results of that survey, known as the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finances (NSSBF), 
were released to the public in 1997, and provided researchers with data that shed new light on 
the availability of credit to small and minority-owned firms.  Since that time, several working 
papers that analyze the 1993 NSSBF have appeared (Cole 1997; Bostic and Lampani 1998; 
Cavalluzzo, Cavaluzzo, and Wolken, 1999; and Blanchflower, Levine, and Zimmerman, 1999).  
The consensus among these papers is that firms owned by African-Americans are denied credit 
at far greater rates than white-owned firms, and that this disparity cannot be explained by the 
data available from the survey.1  
                                                 
1.  The 1993 NSSBF does not provide information on the financial condition of the surveyed 
firms’ owners—information that creditors rely upon in evaluating loan applications from small 
businesses.  Hence, all of these studies are plagued by omitted-variable bias. 
 
 
−2− 
This study also uses data from the 1993 NSSBF to analyze whether race, ethnicity, or 
gender play a role in the small-business credit allocation decision of lenders.  The analysis 
reveals that prospective lenders are significantly more likely to deny credit to firms owned by 
Asian-Americans or African-Americans than to firms owned by whites or Hispanic-Americans.  
Firms owned by African-Americans are rejected four times as often as white-owned firms, while 
Asian-American firms are rejected twice as often.  However, unequal outcomes do not, in 
themselves, establish that prospective lenders treat minorities and non-minorities differently.  
Unequal outcomes may be attributable to differences in other loan, firm, or firm-owner 
characteristics that are correlated with race.   
Consequently, this study also employs a large number of potential control variables to 
provide more direct evidence about whether lenders are more likely to deny credit to minority-
owned small businesses.  These variables include: the type of loan--working capital, motor 
vehicle, equipment, land/buildings, or inventory; the age, experience, education, and 
creditworthiness of the firm’s primary owner; the size, capital structure, industry, organizational 
form (corporation, partnership, or proprietorship), and creditworthiness of the firm.  Accounting 
for these control variables does, indeed, substantially reduce the disparity in loan denial rates 
between minority-owned and non-minority-owned firms.  Yet the differences in rejection rates 
between firms owned by whites and firms owned by Asian-Americans and African-Americans 
remain both statistically and economically significant, even in the presence of these factors.   
While compelling, these results cannot be interpreted as incontrovertible evidence of 
discrimination because the NSSBF data do not allow one to control for the wealth and income of 
the firm’s owner(s)—variables that conventional wisdom suggests are important to the credit 
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allocation decision. 2  However, omitted variable bias may not be as big a problem as it first 
appears.  First, it is well known that personal wealth and income are highly correlated with a 
person’s education, age, and experience.  These latter three variables are included in the 
analysis, and serve as proxies for personal income and wealth.  Second, omitted variable bias 
should affect Hispanic-owned and Female-owned firms just as it should affect Asian-owned and 
Black-owned firms.  Yet the analysis finds no significant differences in the denial rates of 
Hispanic-owned and Female-owned firms relative to the denial rate of Non-Hispanic white-
owned firms.  Third, the denial rates of Black-owned and Asian-owned firms are greater than the 
denial rate of Non-Hispanic white-owned firms when the prospective lender is a commercial 
bank, but not when the prospective lender is a non-bank.  If omitted variable bias is driving the 
results, then minority-denial rates should be higher at both banks and non-banks. 
The structure of the remainder of this article is as follows.  Section I describes the source 
of the data (the Federal Reserve Board’s 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finances) and 
the variables from that source that are used to explain loan approval rates.  Section II describes 
the logistic regression methodology that is used to model loan approval rates.  Section III 
presents the results first from univariate analysis and then from multivariate analysis of the data. 
 And section IV presents a summary and conclusions. 
                                                 
2.  Munnell et al. (1996) relied upon a very detailed survey by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Boston, which collected the actual data and variables loan officers said they used in deciding 
whether or not to extend home mortgage credit.  This study relies upon the data collected from 
borrowers rather than from the loan officers that allocate credit, and these data are not as 
comprehensive as the data used by loan officers.  Moreover, the underwriting standards for home 
mortgages are fairly uniform, but are much more heterogeneous across small business loans.   
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I.  Data 
A.  The 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finances 
This study uses data from the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finances 
(NSSBF), which was co-sponsored and co-funded by the Federal Reserve Board and the U.S. 
Small Business Administration.  The firms surveyed constitute a nationally representative 
sample of 4,637 small businesses operating in the United States as of year-end 1992, where a 
small business is defined as a non-financial, non-farm business employing fewer than 500 full-
time equivalent employees.  These data are broadly representative of approximately five million 
firms operating in the U.S. as of year-end 1992.  For a detailed description of the 1993 NSSBF, 
see Cole and Wolken (1995).
The NSSBF provides detailed information about each firm's most recent borrowing 
experience during 1991-94,3 including whether or not the firm applied for credit, the type of 
credit, the identity and characteristics of the potential lender to which the firm applied, what 
other financial services (if any) the firm obtained from that potential lender, and whether the 
potential lender extended or denied credit to the firm.  Survey data also provide information on 
each firm’s balance sheet; income statement; credit history; firm characteristics, including 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) category, organizational form (i.e., proprietorship, 
partnership, S-corporation, or C-corporation), and age; and demographic characteristics of each 
firm’s primary owner, including race, ethnicity, age, education, experience, and credit history.   
 
                                                 
3.  The majority of these loan applications were made during 1994, and more than 90 percent of 
these applications were made in 1993 or 1994.  The results of the analysis in this study are not 
qualitatively affected by the exclusion of loan applications made prior to 1993. 
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B.  Factors affecting the credit allocation decision 
In the literature on home mortgage lending, it is standard practice to model the lender as 
a profit-maximizing firm that borrows funds at a rate set by a perfectly competitive wholesale 
funds market and lends these funds at a rate set by a perfectly competitive retail funds market, 
i.e., the firm cannot affect either the rate at which it borrows in the wholesale market or the rate 
at which it lends in the retail market.  To maximize its expected profits, the lender’s primary 
decision variable is the amount of risk it is willing to incur when making a loan in the retail 
funds market.  For home mortgage loans, there are two primary sources of risk—default risk and 
prepayment risk.  But for small-business loans, which typically have much shorter durations than 
fixed-rate mortgage, the primary source of risk is limited to default risk.  Hence, the lender’s 
observable realization for its profit-maximizing level of risk is the default risk of the 
prospectiveborrowers to which the lender extends credit.  In other words, the probability that the 
lender will extend credit to a prospective borrower is a function of the lender’s assessment of the 
prospective borrower’s default risk: 
 
Pr (Extend Credit) = f (Prospective Borrower’s Default Risk) 
 
To make this model operational, one only needs to observe the lender’s decision whether or not 
to extend credit to a prospective borrower and to observe the factors used by the lender to assess 
the prospective borrower’s default risk.4 
                                                 
4.  In practice, the lender’s profit-maximizing level of risk also depends upon recovery rates in 
the event of default (Shaffer 1996).  For the purposes of this study, it is assumed that the same 
factors that influence default also influence recovery rates. 
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The literature on residential mortgage lending provides a rich set of potential factors that 
the lender might use to assess a prospective borrower’s default risk.  A large number of these 
factors are represented in the NSSBF data base, including the credit history of the prospective 
borrower (hereafter, the “firm”); the age, size, capital structure, profitability, organizational 
form, and industry of the firm; the age, education, and experience, and credit history of the 
firm’s primary owner; the size and proposed use of the prospective loan; and the firm’s pre-
existing relationships with its prospective lender.  Conversations with bankers who make small 
business loans confirm that these variables are important to the credit allocation decision.5 
The creditworthiness of the firm is proxied by the number of business delinquencies 
during the past three years, and creditworthiness of the primary owner is proxied by the number 
of personal delinquencies during the past three years.  This is the first article to use such 
delinquency data to measure firm riskiness in the small-business credit allocation decision, even 
though these data are commonly used by lenders in assessing creditworthiness. 6 
The age of the firm is measured as (the natural logarithm of) the number of years the firm 
has been in business under current ownership.  Size is proxied by (the natural logarithms of) 
annual sales.  Capital structure is proxied by the ratio of total equity to total assets.  Profitability 
is proxied by return on assets.  Organizational form is proxied by a set of dummy variables 
                                                 
5.  In preparations for the NSSBF, the author participated in interviews with loan officers of nine 
different banks that make small business loans.  Information garnered from these interviews 
influenced the decision to include or exclude potential survey questions. 
6.  More specifically, survey respondents were asked the following two questions: 
(1)  Within the past three years, on how many different personal obligations has the principal 
owner been 60 or more days delinquent? 
(2)  Within the past three years, on how many different business obligations has the firm been 60 
or more days delinquent? 
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indicating whether the firm is organized as a proprietorship, partnership, S-corporation, or 
(regular) C-corporation.  Industrial classification is proxied by a set of dummy variables 
indicating the firm’s one-digit SIC code.  The age and experience of the primary owner are 
measured in years, and the education of the primary owner is measured by a set of dummy 
variables indicating whether the primary owner completed high school, attended college, 
completed college, or attended graduate school.   
The proposed use of the loan proceeds is proxied by a set of dummy variables indicating 
whether the purpose was for working capital, to purchase a motor vehicle, to purchase 
equipment, or for some other purpose.  The size of the prospective loan is measured by the dollar 
amount for which the firm applied divided by the dollar value of the firm’s total assets.   
The firm’s pre-existing relationships with its prospective lender are measured by the 
length of the firm’s pre-existing relationship and a set of dummy variables indicating whether the 
firm had a pre-existing relationship with the prospective lender and whether the firm previously 
obtained from the prospective lender a checking account, savings account, a loan, a line of 
credit, a lease, or any one or more of a series of financial management services.7  Table 1 
summarizes these potential explanatory variables. 
Because sample firms applied for credit at differing points in time across four years, it is 
important to make some allowances for differences in the business cycle.  Table 2 shows the 
distribution of the 2,007 loan applications and acceptances/denials across time.  Half of the 
                                                 
7.  Cole (1998) finds that several of these relationship variables are important in determining 
whether or not a small business is denied credit.  Following Cole and Wolken (1995), financial 
management services are defined as encompassing “transaction services, cash management 
services, credit related services, brokerage services, and trust and pension services.”  See Cole 
and Wolken (1995) p.633 footnote 8 for more detailed definitions of these categories. 
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applications were made during 1994, and more than another third during 1993.  Even so, clearly 
apparent in this table is the trend toward easier credit in the later years.  Denial rates rise from 
20.6% in 1991 to a high of 28.3% in 1992 before declining to 17.2% in 1993 and 11.2% in 1994. 
 To control for these differences in credit availability across time, a set of dummy variables 
indicating the year in which the firm applied for its most recent loan is included in the model. 
 
II.  Methodology 
In examining the factors influencing the probability of loan denial, a single-equation 
binary logit model is an obvious choice, and has two desirable properties.  First, it yields 
unbiased and consistent parameter estimates; second, it provides acceptable inferences about the 
firms that apply for a loan.  The probability-of-denial equation is:  
 
D*j = β ' xj +µj  
 
where D*j is an unobservable index of the probability that a firm’s loan application will be 
denied; xj is a vector of individual firm characteristics developed in the previous sections; β is a 
vector of parameter estimates for the independent variables; µj is a normally distributed random 
disturbance term with zero mean and unknown constant variance σµ2; and j = 1, 2, . . . , M; where 
M is the total number of firms applying for credit.  Let Dj be an observable variable that is equal 
to one if D*j > 0 and zero if D*j ≤ 0.  
In this particular application, Dj is equal to one if a firm is denied credit and zero 
otherwise. Since D*j is equal to β _ xj +µj, the probability that D*j > 0 is equal to the probability 
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that β _ xj > 0, or, equivalently, the probability that (µj > - β _ xj).  Therefore, one can write the 
probability that Dj is equal to one as the probability that (µj > - β _ xj) , or, equivalently, that 
Prob(Dj = 1) = 1 - Φ (-β _ xj), where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of ε, here assumed 
to be logistic.  The probability that Dj is equal to zero is then simply Φ (-β _ xj).  The likelihood 
function L for this model is: 
 
L   =   Π  [Φ (-β _ xj)]   Π  [1 - Φ (-β _ xj)] 
                    Dj = 0                      Dj = 1 
 
III.  Results 
A.  Univariate Results 
Column 2 of Table 3 indicates how many sample firms applied for credit, while columns 
3 and 4 show how many firms were denied and extended credit, respectively.  Of the 2,007 firms 
that applied for credit during 1991-94, 1,695 or 84.4% were extended credit while 315 or 15.6% 
were denied credit.  For minority firms, 33.5% were denied credit, whereas, for non-minority 
firms, only 11.8% were denied credit.  Of the minority firms, 16.3% of the Hispanic firms, 
26.8% of the Asian firms, and 47.0% of the Black firms were denied credit.  By sex, 21.4% of 
the Female-owned firms but only 14.5% of the Male-owned firms were denied credit.  Thus, the 
outcomes of the firms’ most recent credit application were more negative for each of the four 
minority groups examined, especially for the group of Black-owned firms.  However, unequal 
outcomes do not constitute evidence of disparate treatment.  If minority status is correlated with 
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economic variables important to the credit allocation decision, then one would expect to find 
unequal outcomes by minority status. 
Table 4 presents univariate statistics for demographic characteristics of the sample when 
categorized by whether the firm was extended or denied credit.  Column 2 present the means for 
all of the firms applying for credit, while columns 3 and present the means for firms that were 
denied credit and that were extended credit, respectively.  Column 5 present the results of a t-test 
for differences in the means in columns 2 and 3.  These statistics show that firms denied credit 
were significantly more likely to be owned by Asians, Blacks, and Females, but less likely to be 
owned by Non-Hispanic Whites or Males.  Firms denied credit were not more likely to be owned 
by Hispanics. 
 
B.  Multivariate Results 
In this section, tests are conducted to determine whether the differences in credit 
availability revealed by univariate analysis hold up after controlling for differences in firm, firm 
owner, and loan characteristics. If Asian firms, Black firms, and Female firms differ 
systematically from other firms along one or more of these characteristics, then the observed 
univariate differences in credit availability may disappear after controlling for these firm, owner, 
and loan characteristics.  If differences remain, then the evidence would be consistent with 
disparate treatment of minorities by lenders.  
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for the control variables.  Statistics are presented 
for all 2,007 firms (column 2) and for groups of firms as defined by race, ethnicity, and sex.  
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Columns 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 show statistics for Non-Minority, Asian, Black, Hispanic, and Female-
owned firms, respectively.   
These statistics show that Non-Minority firms were older and larger (as measured by 
both assets and sales); and had primary owners that were older, more experienced, and reported 
fewer delinquencies on personal obligations.8  Hispanic firms were the most profitable, or more 
accurately, the least unprofitable, as each of the four sub-groups of firms had negative return on 
assets.  Asian firms reported the fewest while Black firms reported the most business 
delinquencies.  In fact, Black firms reported twice the number of business delinquencies and 
non-minority firms.  Non-minority firms were much less likely to be organized as 
proprietorships than minority firms.  Minority firms were much more likely to be classified as 
business-services (SIC 7000-7999) firms than non-minority firms.  Overall, the statistics in Table 
6 suggest that at least some of the univariate differences in credit availability to non-minority 
and minority firms observed in Tables 3 through 5 can be attributed to differences in owner and 
firm characteristics, particularly with respect to the age, experience, and creditworthiness of the 
firm’s primary owner and to the size and creditworthiness of the firm itself. 
Table 6 presents the results from estimating the probability that a small business would 
be extended credit as a function of four race, ethnicity, and sex indicator variables—Asian, 
Black, Hispanic, and Female (column 2); and as a function of these race, ethnicity, and sex 
variables plus seven variables pertaining to the characteristics of the firm’s primary owner—
Owner’s age, Owner’s experience, Completed high school, Attended college, Completed college, 
                                                 
8.  The creditworthiness of a firm’s primary owner is one of the key variables used in credit-
scoring models for small-business loans, such as the model marketed by Fair-Isaac. 
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Attended graduate school, and Owner’s personal delinquencies—(column 3).  The results in 
column 2 are presented as a benchmark for evaluating results obtained for specifications that also 
include control variables.  In column 2, the coefficients of the indicator variables for Asian-, 
Black-, and Female-owned firms are negative and statistically significant, with associated t-
statistics of -3.79, -10.88, and -2.53, respectively.   
The results in column 3 demonstrate that the size and statistical significance of the 
indicator variables for Asian-, Black-, and Female-owned firms are attenuated the inclusion of 
control variables for owner characteristics.  Four of the seven control variables—Completed high 
school, Completed College, Attended graduate school, and Owner’s Personal Delinquencies, are 
statistically significant at least at the 0.05 level; and a fifth, Owner’s experience, is significant at 
the 0.10 level.  As hypothesized, lenders are more likely to extend credit to firms whose owners 
have more experience and education, and less likely to extend credit to firms whose owners have 
more delinquencies on personal obligations.  After controlling for the characteristics of the 
firm’s primary owner, the indicator variables for Asian- and Black-owned firms, but not for 
Female-owned firms, remain statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
Tables 7-9 are similar to Table 6, in that each shows how different sets of control 
variables attenuates the significance of the race, ethnicity, and sex indicator variables.  Table 7 
introduces six variables to control for differences in loan characteristics—five dummy variables 
indicating the intended use of the loan (Working Capital, Motor Vehicle, Equipment, Land and 
Buildings, and Inventory) and one variable indicating the amount for which the firm applied as a 
portion of the firm’s asset size.  The five intended-use dummies identify loans that typically 
would be collateralized by assets purchased with loan proceeds.  Such collateral should enhance 
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the prospects that a prospective lender would extend credit.  Indeed, all five dummies have 
positive coefficients, and four (Working Capital, Motor Vehicle, Equipment, and Land and 
Buildings) are statistically significant at the 0.01 level—strong evidence that lenders are more 
likely to extend credit to purchase hard assets.  Also significant at the 0.01 level and with the 
hypothesized negative coefficient is the amount for which the firm applied as a portion of firm 
asset size.  The larger was the size of the loan relative to the size of the firm, the less likely was 
the potential lender to extend credit.  After controlling for loan characteristics, the indicator 
variables for Asian-, Black-, and Female-owned firms remain negative and statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level. 
Table 8 introduces nine variables to control for differences in firm characteristics—
ln(Firm Age), Equity to assets, Income to assets, ln(Total sales), Business delinquencies, Urban 
location, and three dummy variables indicating organizational form—C-Corporation, S-
Corporation, and Partnership (proprietorship is the omitted category.)  While none of the 
organizational-form variables are significant, four of the remaining six firm-characteristics 
variables are significant at the 0.01 level.  Prospective lenders are more likely to extend credit to 
older firms.  Typically, this is attributable to reputational effects (Diamond 1991).  Potential 
creditors also are more likely to extend credit to larger firms (as measured by the natural 
logarithms of annual sales) and to firm with fewer business delinquencies.  Lenders are less 
likely to lend to urban firms.  This may reflect the greater competitiveness of banking markets in 
urban areas.  Petersen and Rajan (1995) theorize that lenders are more likely to grant credit to 
small businesses located in less concentrated banking markets because profitable customers are 
less likely to take their business to other lenders.  After controlling for the firm’s characteristics, 
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the indicator variables for Asian- and Black-owned firms, but not for Female-owned firms, 
remain significant at the 0.05 level.   
Table 9 introduces seven variables to control for differences in the pre-existing 
relationships between the firm and its prospective lender—five dummy variables indicating 
financial services obtained from the lender prior to the loan application (Checking, Savings, 
Loan, Line of credit, and Financial management service), one dummy variable indicating any 
sort of pre-existing relationship, and a continuous variable indicating the Length of relationship. 
  Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995) establish that pre-existing 
relationships between a firm and its lender affect the terms upon which lenders grant credit, so it 
is likely that these relationships also affect the likelihood that the lender will grant credit.  
Indeed, Cole (1998) provides strong evidence that pre-existing relationships increase the 
probability that a prospective lender will extend credit to a firm.   
As shown in column 3 of Table 10, four of the seven relationship variables are significant 
at the 0.01 level, and three have the hypothesized sign.  Prospective lenders are more likely to 
extend credit to firms that already obtain saving accounts or financial management services from 
the lender.  Such services enable the prospective lender to generate valuable private information 
about the firm’s financial prospects, information that is important to the credit allocation 
decision.  The coefficient for checking accounts in counter-intuitively negative and significant at 
the 0.05 level.  One potential explanation is that firms obtaining checking services but no other 
services of the lender are viewed negatively by the lender.9  The length of the firm’s pre-existing 
                                                 
9.  Indeed, one loan officer from a large money-center bank stated that small-business loans, by 
themselves, are not a profitable product for the bank to offer.  According to this source, only 
when the bank obtains all of a small firm’s business, including deposit accounts, is the small 
business relationship profitable. 
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relationship with its prospective lender is positive and significant at the 0.10 level, while the 
indicator variable for firms with no pre-existing relationships is negative and significant at the 
0.01 level.  Longer relationships provide more time over which the prospective lender can 
observe the firm and generate private information.  After controlling for pre-existing firm-
creditor relationships, the indicator variables for Asian-, Black-, and Female-owned firms remain 
negative and significant at least at the 0.05 level. 
In Table 10, the effects of race and ethnicity on the likelihood of receiving credit are 
analyzed in the presence of each of the control variables introduced in Tables 7-10.  In addition, 
three dummy variables indicating the year in which the firm applied are included to control for 
differences in the business cycle that were evident in Table 2.10  The most striking result in Table 
11 is the finding that the influences of race are qualitatively unchanged by the inclusion of the 
relationship variables—the indicator variables for Asian- and Black-owned firms remain both 
significantly and economically significant even in the presence of the multitude of control 
variables.  Neither ethnicity or sex, however, are significant in explaining loan denials. 
Farber (1987) develops an econometric technique for using binary-choice models that 
can be used to decompose the differences in denial rates of minority and non-minority firms into 
‘explained’ and ‘unexplained’ changes.  The ‘explained’ component represents the difference in 
denial rates that can be attributed to observed differences in the characteristics of the two groups 
of firms; the ‘unexplained’ component represents the difference in denial rates resulting from 
minority status: 
                                                 
10.  Also estimated were specifications that included a series of dummy variables indicating the 
nine Census regions and two-digit Standard Industrial Classification categories, in addition to the 
variables represented in columns 3 and 4 of Table 6.  The results from estimating those 
specification are not qualitatively different from those here, in that each of the variables 
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Denial Rate white - Denial Rate black = Explained + Unexplained. 
 
The explained component is calculated by estimating the denial model (omitting the minority 
indicator variables) for non-minority firms and using the coefficients βwhite from this model to 
predict the denial rates of both minority Φ(Xnonwhite βwhite)  and non-minority firms             
Φ(βwhite Xwhite), where Φ is the logistic cumulative density function: 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
significant in column 3 and 4 also are significant in the expanded model. 
Explained =  Φ(Xnonwhite βwhite)  - Φ(Xwhite βwhite ). 
 
The unexplained component is calculated by estimating the denial model (omitting the minority 
indicator variables) for both minority and non-minority firms, and using the coefficients of these 
models to predict the denial rates for minority firms: 
 
Unexplained =  Φ(Xwhite βwhite)  - Φ(βnonwhite Xnonwhite). 
 
Using this approach, the difference in the denial rates of Non-Hispanic white-owned firms and 
Black-owned firms is 45.4% - 6.9% = 38.5 percentage points; the explained component is  
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27.5% - 6.9% = 20.6 percentage points, and the unexplained component is 45.4% - 27.5% = 17.9 
percentage points.  In other words, just over half of the difference in denial rates of Black- and 
White-owned firms is attributable to differences in observable characteristics and slightly under 
half is unexplained.  (Unfortunately, the small sample size of the Asian-owned firms, 82 
observations, precludes a similar analysis of the difference in the denial rates Asian- and White-
owned firms.)   
Overall, these findings are consistent with the results of Munnell et al. 1996 and Duca 
and Rosenthal 1993, who also find that controlling for creditworthiness variables that are 
correlated with race account for much, but not all, of the observed disparities in loan approval 
rates across racial lines. 
 
C.  Loan Denial Rates at Banks and Non-banks 
Because commercial banks are the primary source of small-business loans (see Cole and 
Wolken, 1996) and because the Community Reinvestment Act requires bank regulators to assess 
whether banks are meeting the credit needs of their communities, including minority-owned 
small businesses, it is of interest to examine loan denial rates broken down by whether the 
prospective lender is a commercial bank or a nonbank.  Nonbanks include finance and insurance 
companies as well as thrift institutions.  Table 11 shows such a breakdown.  As shown in 
column 3, the loan denial rates for each of the four minority groups are higher at commercial 
banks than at nonbanks.  For Black-owned firms, the difference is especially large.  Banks 
rejected 52.3% whereas nonbanks rejected only 30.9% of the applications by Black-owned 
firms. 
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Table 12 presents the results of a multivariate analysis of the loan denial decision and is 
similar to Table 10, differing only by the fact that the four indicator variables for minority status 
are split into eight bank and nonbank indicator variables, four bank and four non-bank.  This test 
enables us to ascertain whether the differences in denial rates observed in Table 11 hold up after 
controlling for differences in observable characteristics.   Indeed, they do.  Of the eight bank-
nonbank indicators of minority status only the bank indicators for Asian- and Black-owned firms 
are statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  These finding suggest that Asian- and Black-owned 
firms are receiving disparate treatment from commercial banks but not non-banks.  Moreover, 
the difference in the denial rates of minorities at banks and nonbanks argues strongly that 
omitted variable bias is not responsible for this finding.  Otherwise, one would expect to find that 
nonbanks, as well as banks, disproportionately reject minority borrowers. 
 
D. A Test for Sample-Selection Bias and Other Robustness Checks 
While the single-equation probit methodology employed thus far enables one to make unbiased 
inferences about the population of firms that applied for credit, it does not allow us to make 
unbiased about the set of firms that chose, for whatever reason, not to apply for credit.  Hence, I 
re-estimated each of the models presented in Tables 6-12 using a bivariate probit model that 
enables me to test for sample-selection bias.  In this model, an application equation is estimated 
jointly with the denial equation.  The application equation included the xxx variables that appear 
in the denial equation plus the log of the firm’s longest relationship with any financial institution 
and three variables indicating alternative sources of financing that might affect the firm’s 
demand for credit: whether the firm used trade credit for financing, whether the firm used credit 
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cards for business financing, and whether the firm had obtained additional equity during the 
previous three years. 
 
IV.  Summary and Conclusions 
This article analyzes factors influencing the decisions of prospective lenders to extend 
credit to small and minority-owned businesses.  Using data from a government survey of small 
businesses, the analysis reveals that prospective lenders are four times more likely to deny credit 
to firms owned by African-Americans than to firms owned by non-Hispanic whites and are twice 
as likely to deny credit to Asian-American firms than to firms owned by non-Hispanic whites.  
Differences in rejection rates between firms owned by whites and firms owned by Asian-
Americans or African-Americans are both statistically and economically significant after 
controlling for differences in the type and size of the prospective loan; in the age, experience, 
education, and creditworthiness of the firm’s primary owner; in the age, size, leverage, 
profitability, organizational form, creditworthiness, and industry of the firm; and in the types and 
length of pre-existing relationships between the firm and prospective lender.  
While compelling, these results cannot be interpreted as incontrovertible evidence of 
discrimination because the NSSBF data do not allow one to control for unobservable variables 
such as the wealth and income of the firm’s owner(s)—variables that conventional wisdom 
suggests are important to the credit allocation decision.  However, the importance of omitted 
variable bias to these results is mitigated by at least three factors.  First, it is well known that 
personal wealth and income are highly correlated with a person’s education, age, and experience, 
and these latter three variables are included in the analysis, serving as proxies for personal 
income and wealth.  Second, omitted variable bias should affect Hispanic-owned and Female-
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owned firms just as it should affect Asian-owned and Black-owned firms, yet the analysis finds 
no significant differences in the denial rates of Hispanic-owned and Female-owned firms relative 
to the denial rate of Non-Hispanic white-owned firms.  Third, the denial rates of Black-owned 
and Asian-owned firms are greater than the denial rate of Non-Hispanic white-owned firms when 
the prospective lender is a commercial bank, but not when the prospective lender is a non-bank.  
If omitted variable bias is driving the results, then minority-denial rates should be higher at both 
banks and non-banks. 
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Table 1:  Variable Definitions and Their Expected Relationship with the 
Probability that the Firm will be Extended Credit. 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
Definition 
 
Expected 
Sign  
Business 
Delinquencies 
 
Number of different business obligations on which the 
firm has been 60 or more days delinquent within last 
three years. 
 
Negative 
 
Personal 
Delinquencies 
 
Number of different personal obligations on which the 
firm’s primary owner has been 60 or more days 
delinquent within last three years. 
 
Negative 
 
Firm  
Age 
 
Natural logarithm of the number of years the firm has 
been in business under current ownership. 
 
Positive 
 
Firm  
Industry 
 
Dummy variables indicating the firm’s two-digit 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) category 
 
Mixed 
 
Firm  
Capital Structure 
 
Ratio of total shareholder equity to total assets 
 
Positive 
 
Firm  
Organizational Form 
 
Dummy variables indicating proprietorship, 
partnership, S-corporation, or C-Corporation 
 
Mixed 
 
Firm Profitability 
 
Ratio of net income to total assets 
 
Positive  
Firm Size 
 
Natural logarithm of total sales 
 
Positive  
Owner Age 
 
Years 
 
Positive  
Owner Education 
 
Dummy variables indicating whether the owner 
completed high school, attended college, completed 
college, or attended graduate school. 
 
Positive 
 
Owner Experience 
 
Years of experience in managing or owning a 
business 
 
Positive 
 
Loan  
Size 
 
Ratio of amount of loan for which the firm applied  
to total assets 
 
Negative 
 
Loan  
Type 
 
Dummy variables indicating the intended primary use 
of loan proceeds.  Working capital, motor vehicle, 
equipment, real estate, inventory, or other use. 
 
Mixed 
 
Firm’s  
Pre-Existing 
Relationships  
with Lender 
 
Dummy variables indicating the firm obtained 
checking accounts, savings accounts, lines of credit, 
loans, or financial management services prior to 
applying for the loan.  
 
Positive 
 
Length of  
Pre-Existing 
Relationships  
with Lender 
 
Number of years the firm has conducted business with 
the prospective lender.  
 
Positive 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
−24− 
 
Table 2 
Credit denials and approvals 
for a sample of 2,007 firms applying for credit during 1991-94 
 
 
 
Number of firms  
applying for credit 
(column percentage) 
 
Number of firms  
denied credit 
(row percentage) 
 
Number of firms  
extended credit  
(row percentage) 
 
All firms  
applying for credit 
 
 
2,007 
(100%) 
 
312 
(15.6%) 
 
1,695 
(84.4%) 
 
Firms applying 
during 1991 
 
 
   68 
(3.4%) 
 
 14 
(20.6%) 
 
   54 
(79.4%) 
 
Firms applying 
during 1992 
 
 
223 
(11.1%) 
 
  63 
(28.3%) 
 
160 
(71.7%) 
 
Firms applying 
during 1993 
 
 
716 
(35.7%) 
 
123 
(17.2%) 
 
593 
(82.8%) 
 
Firms applying 
during 1994 
 
 
1,000 
(49.8%) 
 
112 
(11.2%) 
 
888 
(88.8%) 
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Table 3 
Credit denials and approvals  
for a sample of 2,007 small businesses applying for credit during 1991-94 
 
 
 
Number of firms  
applying for credit 
(column percentage) 
 
Number of firms  
denied credit 
(row percentage) 
 
Number of firms  
extended credit  
(row percentage) 
 
All firms  
applying for credit 
 
 
2,007 
(100%) 
 
312 
(15.6%) 
 
1,695 
(84.4%) 
 
Non-minority 
 
1,661 
(82.8%) 
 
196 
(11.8%) 
 
1,465 
(88.2%) 
 
Minority 
 
 
 
346 
(17.2%) 
 
116 
(33.5%) 
 
230 
(66.5%) 
 
Asian 
 
82 
(4.1%) 
 
22 
(26.8%) 
 
60 
(73.2%) 
 
Black 
 
168 
(8.4%) 
 
79 
(47.0%) 
 
89 
(53.0%) 
 
Hispanic 
 
 
 
98 
(4.9%) 
 
16 
(16.3%) 
 
82 
(83.7%) 
 
Male  
 
1,713 
(85.4%) 
 
249 
(14.5%) 
 
1,464 
(85.5%) 
 
Female   
 
 
 
312 
(15.6%) 
 
63 
(21.4%) 
 
231 
(78.6%) 
 
Note: Two firms applying for credit identified themselves as both Black and Hispanic.   
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Table  4 
Univariate statistics for demographic characteristics of 2,007 small businesses that applied for 
credit.  For each variable identified in column 1, the mean appears in the first row and the 
standard error appears in parentheses in the second row.  Results for all firms that applied for a 
loan appear in column 2.  Results for firms denied credit and extended credit appear in columns 
3 and 4, respectively.  Column 5 presents the results of t-tests for differences in the proportions 
of the firms denied credit and extended credit.    
(1)                 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5)  
Variable 
 
Firm applied for credit. 
 
Firm denied credit 
 
Firm extended credit 
 
t-test  
 
Number of firms 
 
 
 
 
2,007 
 
 
312 
 
 
1,695 
 
 
 
 
 
Demographic 
characteristic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 White 
 
82.76 
(0.84) 
 
63.17 
(2.72) 
 
86.39 
(0.83) 
 
-8.16 ** 
 
 Asian 
 
4.092 
(0.44) 
 
7.05 
(1.45) 
 
3.54 
(0.45) 
 
 2.31  * 
 
 Black 
 
8.37 
(0.62) 
 
25.32 
(2.47) 
 
5.25 
(0.54) 
 
 7.95 ** 
 
 Hispanic 
 
 
 
4.88 
(0.48) 
 
5.13 
(1.25) 
 
4.84 
(0.52) 
 
0.21    
 
 Male     
 
 
85.35 
(0.79) 
 
79.81 
(2.28) 
 
86.37 
(0.83) 
 
-2.71**  
 
 Female 
 
 
14.65 
(0.79) 
 
20.19 
(2.27) 
 
13.63 
(0.83) 
 
2.71**    
 
 
*    Indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level. 
**  Indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 5 
Univariate statistics for characteristics of a sample of 2,007 small businesses applying for credit 
during 1991-94.  For each variable identified in column 1, the mean appears in the first row and 
the standard error appears in parentheses in the second row.  Results for all firms appear in 
column 2, while results for Non-minority, Asian, Black, Hispanic and Female firms appear in 
columns 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, respectively.    
(1)                  
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
(7)  
 
Variable 
 
 
All 
firms  
 
Non-
minority 
firms 
 
 
Asian  
firms 
 
 
Black 
firms 
 
 
Hispanic 
firms 
 
 
Female 
firms  
Number of firms 
 
2,007 
 
1,661 
 
82 
 
168 
 
98 
 
294  
Owner Characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Owner’s age 
 
49.63 
(0.24) 
 
50.07 
(0.26) 
 
46.96 
(0.89) 
 
47.67 
(0.79) 
 
47.93 
(1.03) 
 
47.69 
(0.63)  
Owner’s experience 
 
20.02 
(0.24) 
 
20.92 
(0.26) 
 
15.32 
(0.80) 
 
15.36 
(0.78) 
 
16.96 
(0.97) 
 
16.27 
(0.64)  
Owner’s education 
   
 
15.20 
(0.05) 
 
15.21 
(0.05) 
 
15.83 
(0.23) 
 
15.17 
(0.16) 
 
14.67 
(0.23) 
 
14.95 
(0.12)  
Personal delinquencies 
 
0.32 
(0.02) 
 
0.23 
(0.02) 
 
 0.45 
(0.11) 
 
1.00 
(0.10) 
 
0.43 
(0.10) 
 
0.42 
(0.06)  
Firm Characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Business delinquencies 
 
0.64 
(0.03) 
 
0.59 
(0.03) 
 
 0.54 
(0.12) 
 
1.19 
(0.10) 
 
0.63 
(0.12) 
 
0.71 
(0.07)  
Firm age 
 
15.50 
(0.31) 
 
16.26 
(0.35) 
 
10.22 
(0.79) 
 
11.47 
(0.72) 
 
14.21 
(1.31) 
 
12.87 
(0.74)  
ln(Total assets) 
 
12.89 
(0.05) 
 
13.14 
(0.05) 
 
12.57 
(0.20) 
 
11.25 
(0.14) 
 
11.87 
(0.19) 
 
11.87 
(0.13)  
Equity to assets 
 
0.34 
(0.01) 
 
0.35 
(0.02) 
 
0.34 
(0.05) 
 
0.27 
(0.06) 
 
0.27 
(0.08) 
 
0.26 
(0.04)  
Income to assets 
 
0.37 
(0.02) 
 
0.35 
(0.02) 
 
0.35 
(0.10) 
 
0.40 
(0.09) 
 
0.70 
(0.10) 
 
0.46 
(0.06)  
ln(Total sales) 
 
 
13.95 
(0.05) 
 
14.20 
(0.05) 
 
 13.35 
(0.18) 
 
12.45 
(0.14) 
 
12.90 
(0.19) 
 
13.03 
(0.12)  
Organizational form 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
     C-corporation 
 
 
0.44 
(0.01) 
 
0.45 
(0.01) 
 
 0.41 
(0.05) 
 
0.39 
(0.04) 
 
0.41 
(0.05) 
 
0.35 
(0.03)  
     S-corporation 
 
 
0.29 
(0.01) 
 
0.30 
(0.01) 
 
 0.23 
(0.05) 
 
0.21 
(0.03) 
 
0.16 
(0.04) 
 
0.30 
(0.03)  
     Partnership 
 
 
0.07 
(0.01) 
 
0.07 
(0.01) 
 
 0.07 
(0.03) 
 
0.07 
(0.02) 
 
0.08 
(0.03) 
 
0.07 
(0.01)  
     Proprietorship 
 
 
0.19 
(0.01) 
 
0.18 
(0.01) 
 
 0.29 
(0.05) 
 
0.33 
(0.04) 
 
0.35 
(0.05) 
 
0.28 
(0.01) 
 
Continued . . . . 
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Table 5 (Continued) 
Univariate statistics for characteristics of a sample of 2,007 small businesses applying for credit 
during 1991-94.  For each variable identified in column 1, the mean appears in the first row and 
the standard error appears in parentheses in the second row.  Results for all firms appear in 
column, while results for Non-minority, Asian, Black, and Hispanic firms appear in columns 3, 
4, 5, and 6, respectively.    
(1)                     
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
(7)  
 
Variable 
 
 
All 
firms  
 
Non-
minority 
firms 
 
 
Asian  
firms 
 
 
Black 
firms 
 
 
Hispanic 
firms 
 
 
Female 
firms  
Number of firms 
 
2,007 
 
1,661 
 
82 
 
168 
 
98 
 
294  
Standard Industrial Classification  
Construction and mining 
(10-19) 
 
12.32 
(0.70) 
 
12.30 
(0.77) 
 
 5.49 
(2.40) 
 
13.68 
(2.50) 
 
16.36 
(3.54) 
 
8.16 
(1.60)  
Primary manufacturing 
(20-29) 
 
 7.18 
(0.55) 
 
7.82 
(0.63) 
 
 7.69 
(2.81) 
 
4.21 
(1.46) 
 
0.90 
(0.01) 
 
5.10 
(1.29)  
Other manufacturing 
(30-39) 
 
9.21 
(0.61) 
 
10.33 
(0.71) 
 
 6.59 
(2.62) 
 
3.68 
(1.37) 
 
2.73 
(1.56) 
 
5.78 
(1.36)  
Transportation 
(40-49) 
 
4.96 
(0.46) 
 
4.98 
(0.51) 
 
 2.20 
(1.55) 
 
6.32 
(1.77) 
 
4.55 
(2.00) 
 
5.10 
(1.29)  
Wholesale trade 
(50-51) 
 
10.65 
(0.66) 
 
10.33 
(0.71) 
 
 14.29 
(3.69) 
 
12.11 
(2.37) 
 
10.00 
(2.87) 
 
8.16 
(1.60)  
Retail trade 
(52-59) 
 
19.99 
(0.85) 
 
20.78 
(0.95) 
 
25.27 
(4.58) 
 
8.95 
(2.08) 
 
22.73 
(4.01) 
 
24.49 
(2.51)  
Insurance and real estate 
(60-69) 
 
5.82 
(0.50) 
 
6.34 
(0.57) 
 
2.20 
(1.54) 
 
2.63 
(1.16) 
 
5.45 
(2.18) 
 
5.44 
(1.33)  
Business services 
(70-79) 
 
15.97 
(0.78) 
 
13.18 
(0.79) 
 
23.08 
(4.44) 
 
34.21 
(3.45) 
 
24.55 
(4.12) 
 
22.79 
(2.45)  
Professional services 
(80-89) 
 
13.90 
(0.74) 
 
13.94 
(0.81) 
 
13.19 
(3.57) 
 
14.21 
(2.54) 
 
12.73 
(3.19) 
 
14.97 
(2.08)  
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Table 6 
Multivariate logistic regression results for variables used to explain the importance of race, 
ethnicity, gender, and characteristics of the firm’s primary owner in the extension of credit to a 
sample of 2,007 small businesses that applied for credit during 1991-94.  For each variable 
identified in column 1, the coefficient appears in the first row and its associated t-statistic 
appears in parentheses in the second row.    
    (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3)  
Variable 
 
 
 
  
Intercept 
 
2.08 ** 
(25.43) 
 
2.27 ** 
(4.07)  
Race and ethnicity 
 
 
 
  
Asian 
 
 
-0.99 ** 
(-3.79) 
 
-0.88 ** 
(-3.21)  
Black 
 
 
-1.87 ** 
(-10.88) 
 
-1.48 ** 
(-7.95)  
Hispanic 
 
 
-0.31 
(1.08) 
 
-0.09 
(-0.32)  
Female    
 
 
-0.42* 
(-2.53) 
 
-0.28 
(-1.61)  
Firm owner’s characteristics 
 
 
 
  
Owner age 
 
 
 
 
0.01   
(1.01)  
Owner’s experience 
 
 
 
 
 0.02   
(1.68)  
Completed high school 
 
 
 
 
-0.80 * 
(-2.36)  
Attended college  
 
 
 
 
0.63  
(1.67)  
Completed college 
 
 
 
 
1.04 ** 
(3.24)  
Attended graduate school 
 
 
 
 
0.98 ** 
(2.95)  
Owner’s personal 
delinquencies 
 
 
 
-0.47** 
(-7.82)  
Pseudo R-square 
 
0.071 
 
0.123  
*    Indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level. 
**  Indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 7 
Multivariate logistic regression results for variables used to explain the importance of race, 
ethnicity, and characteristics of the loan for which the firm applied in the extension of credit to a 
sample of 2,007 small businesses that applied for credit during 1991-94.  For each variable 
identified in column 1, the coefficient appears in the first row and its associated t-statistic 
appears in parentheses in the second row.    
    (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3)  
Variable 
 
 
 
  
Intercept 
 
2.08 ** 
(25.43) 
 
1.62** 
(9.26)  
Race and ethnicity 
 
 
 
  
Asian 
 
 
-0.99 ** 
(-3.79) 
 
-1.00 ** 
(-3.78)  
Black 
 
 
-1.87 ** 
(-10.88) 
 
-1.78 ** 
(-9.97)  
Hispanic 
 
 
-0.31 
(1.08) 
 
-0.35 
(-1.20)  
 Female 
 
 
-0.42* 
(-2.53) 
 
-0.41* 
(-2.44)  
Loan Characteristics 
 
 
 
  
Intended use:  
 
 
 
  
     Working capital 
 
 
 
 
0.64** 
(3.36)  
     Motor vehicle 
 
 
 
 
1.02** 
(3.06)  
     Equipment 
 
 
 
 
0.78** 
(3.20)  
     Land and Buildings 
 
 
 
 
0.77** 
(2.84)  
     Inventory 
 
 
 
 
0.67 
(1.55)  
Amount for which the firm 
applied as a portion of assets 
 
 
 
-0.21** 
(-4.14)  
Pseudo R-square 
 
0.071 
 
0.111  
*    Indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level. 
**  Indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 8 
Multivariate logistic regression results for variables used to explain the importance of race, 
ethnicity, firm characteristics in the extension of credit to a nationally representative sample of 
2,012 small businesses that applied for credit during 1991-94.  For each variable identified in 
column 1, the coefficient appears in the first row and its associated t-statistic appears in 
parentheses in the second row.    
    (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3)  
Variable 
 
 
 
  
Intercept 
 
2.08 ** 
(25.43) 
 
-3.12 ** 
(-5.62)  
Race and ethnicity 
 
 
 
  
Asian 
 
 
-0.99 ** 
(-3.79) 
 
-0.69 ** 
(-2.43)  
Black 
 
 
-1.87 ** 
(-10.88) 
 
-1.16 ** 
(-6.10)  
Hispanic 
 
 
-0.31 
(1.08) 
 
0.04 
(0.14)  
Female               
 
-0.42* 
(-2.53) 
 
-0.00 
(-0.00)  
Firm characteristics 
 
 
 
  
Firm age 
 
 
 
0.34 ** 
(3.27)  
Equity to assets 
 
 
 
 
0.12   
(1.29)  
Income to assets 
 
 
 
 
0.09 
(1.20)  
ln(Total sales) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.37 ** 
(8.33)  
Business delinquencies 
 
 
 
 
-0.39 ** 
(-7.42)  
Urban location         
 
 
 
 
-0.62 ** 
(-3.24)  
Organizational form  
     C-corporation 
 
 
 
 
0.04 
(0.19)  
     S-corporation 
 
 
 
 
-0.21 
(-1.53)  
     Partnership 
 
 
 
 
0.48 
(1.53)  
Pseudo R-Square 
 
0.071 
 
0.184  
*    Indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level. 
**  Indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 9  
Multivariate logistic regression results for variables used to explain the importance of race,  
ethnicity, and firm-lender relationships in the extension of credit to a sample of 2,007 small 
businesses that applied for credit during 1991-94.  For each variable identified in column 1, the 
coefficient appears in the first row and its associated t-statistic appears in parentheses in the 
second row.    
    (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3)  
Variable 
 
 
 
  
Intercept 
 
2.08 ** 
(25.43) 
 
2.01 ** 
(12.46)  
Race and ethnicity 
 
 
 
  
Asian 
 
 
-0.99 ** 
(-3.79) 
 
-0.89 ** 
(-3.25)  
Black 
 
 
-1.87 ** 
(-10.88) 
 
-1.62 ** 
(-8.86)  
Hispanic 
 
 
-0.31 
(1.08) 
 
-0.26 
(-0.88)  
Female 
 
 
-0.42* 
(-2.53) 
 
-0.34* 
(-1.99)  
Pre-existing relationships  
 
 
 
  
Checking 
 
 
 
-0.42 * 
(-2.55)  
Savings 
 
 
 
 
0.90 ** 
(4.21)  
Loan 
 
 
 
 
0.11 
(0.66)  
Line of credit   
 
 
 
 
-0.33 
(-1.71)  
Financial management service 
 
 
 
 
 
0.56 ** 
(3.44)  
Length of relationship  
with prospective lender 
 
 
 
 
0.02   
(1.77)  
No pre-existing relationship 
with prospective lender 
 
 
 
 
-1.39 ** 
(-5.89)  
Pseudo-R2 
 
0.071 
 
0.124  
 *   Indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level.    
** Indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 10 
Multivariate logistic regression results for variables used to explain the importance of race,  
ethnicity, and gender in the extension of credit to a sample of 2,007 small businesses that applied 
for credit during 1991-94.  For each variable identified in column 1, the coefficient appears in 
column 2 and its associated t-statistic appears in column 3.  
    (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3)  
Variable 
 
Coefficient 
 
t-statistic  
Intercept 
 
-1.91** 
 
-3.28  
Race and ethnicity 
 
 
 
  
Asian 
 
-0.67 * 
 
-2.23  
Black 
 
-0.89 ** 
 
-4.20  
Hispanic 
 
0.08 
 
0.26  
Female   
 
-0.03 
 
-0.15  
Firm owner’s characteristics 
 
 
 
  
Owner age 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.09  
Owner’s experience 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.75  
Owner’s personal delinquencies 
 
-0.20* 
 
-2.55  
Loan Characteristics 
 
 
 
  
Intended use:  
 
 
 
  
     Working capital 
 
0.47* 
 
2.17  
     Motor vehicle 
 
1.43** 
 
3.82  
     Equipment 
 
0.85** 
 
3.04  
     Land and Buildings 
 
0.78* 
 
2.54  
     Inventory 
 
0.84 
 
1.82  
Amount for which the firm applied / Total assets 
 
-0.12* 
 
-1.96  
Firm characteristics 
 
 
 
  
Firm age 
 
0.50** 
 
3.48  
Equity to assets 
 
0.003 
 
0.03  
Income to assets 
 
0.09 
 
1.08  
ln(Total sales) 
 
0.34** 
 
6.67  
Business delinquencies 
 
-0.34** 
 
-5.26  
Urban location  
 
-0.68** 
 
-3.32  
No pre-existing relationship 
 
-1.63** 
 
-6.07  
Owner’s education dummy variables 
 
Yes 
 
  
Organizational form dummy variables    
 
Yes 
 
  
 One-digit SIC dummy variables 
 
 Yes 
 
  
Financial services dummy variables  
 
Yes 
 
  
Year of Most Recent Loan Dummies 
 
Yes 
 
  
Pseudo-R2 
 
0.246 
 
  
 *   Indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level.    
** Indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 11 
Credit denials and extensions  
to a sample of 2,007 firms applying for credit at banks and nonbanks during 1991-94 
 
 
 
Number of firms  
applying  
for credit 
 
Number of firms  
denied credit 
(row percentage) 
 
Number of firms  
extended credit  
(row percentage) 
 
All firms applying 
 
2,007 
 
 
346 
(17.2%) 
 
1,661 
(82.8%) 
 
Non-minority 
 
1,661 
 
 
196 
(11.8%) 
 
1,465 
(88.2%) 
 
Minority 
 
346 
 
 
116 
(33.5%) 
 
230 
(66.5%) 
 
Asian-Bank 
 
65 
 
 
18 
(27.7%) 
 
47 
(72.3%) 
 
Asian-Nonbank 
 
17 
 
 
4 
(23.5%) 
 
13 
(76.5%) 
 
Black-Bank 
 
126 
 
 
66 
(52.3%) 
 
60 
(47.6%) 
 
Black-Nonbank 
 
42 
 
 
13 
(30.9%) 
 
29 
(69.1%) 
 
Hispanic-Bank 
 
78 
 
 
13 
(16.7%) 
 
65 
(83.3%) 
 
Hispanic-Nonbank 
 
20 
 
 
3 
(15.0%) 
 
17 
(85.0%) 
 
Female-Bank 
 
238 
 
 
52 
(21.8%) 
 
186 
(78.2%) 
 
Female-Nonbank 
 
56 
 
 
11 
(19.6%) 
 
45 
(80.4%) 
 
Note: Two firms applying for credit identified themselves as both Black and Hispanic.  
“Bank” indicates that the firm applied for credit at a commercial bank while “Nonbank” 
indicates that the firm applied for credit at a potential lender other than a commercial bank. 
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Table 12 
Multivariate logistic regression results for variables used to explain the importance of race,  ethnicity, and gender in 
the extension of credit to a sample of 2,007 small businesses that applied at banks and nonbanks for credit during 
1991-94.  For each variable identified in column 1, the coefficient appears in column 2 and its associated t-statistic 
appears in column 3.  
    (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3)  
Variable 
 
Coefficient 
 
t-statistic  
Intercept 
 
-1.74** 
 
-1.90  
Bank is source of loan 
 
-0.39 
 
-1.46  
Race and ethnicity 
 
 
 
  
Asian-Bank 
 
-0.76 * 
 
-2.28  
Black-Bank 
 
-1.20 ** 
 
-5.01  
Hispanic-Bank 
 
0.19 
 
0.52  
Female-Bank 
 
-0.09 
 
-0.44  
Asian-Nonbank 
 
-0.40 
 
-0.57  
Black-Nonbank 
 
0.16 
 
0.35  
Hispanic-Nonbank 
 
-0.46 
 
-0.63  
Female-Nonbank 
 
0.16 
 
0.36  
Firm owner’s characteristics 
 
 
 
  
Owner age 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.069  
Owner’s experience 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.85  
Owner’s personal delinquencies 
 
-0.20** 
 
-2.58  
Loan Characteristics 
 
 
 
  
Intended use:  
 
 
 
  
     Working capital 
 
0.51* 
 
2.35  
     Motor vehicle 
 
1.42** 
 
3.76  
     Equipment 
 
0.76** 
 
2.73  
     Land and Buildings 
 
0.83** 
 
2.67  
     Inventory 
 
0.87 
 
1.86  
Amount for which the firm applied / Total assets 
 
-0.13* 
 
-2.10  
Firm characteristics 
 
 
 
  
Firm age 
 
0.47** 
 
3.22  
Equity to assets 
 
0.02 
 
0.18  
Income to assets 
 
0.10 
 
1.30  
ln(Total sales) 
 
0.35** 
 
6.85  
Business delinquencies 
 
-0.35** 
 
-5.29  
Urban location  
 
-0.68** 
 
-3.50  
No pre-existing relationship 
 
-1.69** 
 
-6.21  
Owner’s education dummy variables 
 
Yes 
 
  
Organizational form dummy variables    
 
Yes 
 
  
 One-digit SIC dummy variables 
 
 Yes 
 
  
Financial services dummy variables  
 
Yes 
 
  
Year of Most Recent Loan Dummies 
 
Yes 
 
  
Pseudo-R2 
 
0.256 
 
  
 *   Indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level.    
** Indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level.  
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